

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 10 VIENNA 2345

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS MARCH 14, 1974

REF: VIENNA 2320

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL
SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS ON MARCH 14, 1974.

PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH 4 ARE CONTAINED REFTEL.

5. UK REP AS HOST FOR OCCASION BEGAN DISCUSSION
ON BASIS OF TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP.
HE SAID ALLIED REPS HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO
THE EXPLANATION EASTERN REPS HAD GIVEN ON 11 MARCH OF
THEIR VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES.
IN REPLY, ALLIES REPS EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF THEIR

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OWN APPROACH AND PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN ABLE, IN THE

SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, TO HAVE A USEFUL EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT. ALLIED REPS HOPED THIS MAY HAVE SERVED TO CLARIFY THEIR THINKING FOR EAST AND THE REASONS BEHIND IT.

6. FOR THEIR PART, ALLIED REPS HAD SINCE MARCH 11 HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY AND REFLECT FURTHER ON THE VARIOUS ARGUMENTS EAST HAD PUT. THESE COVERED A WIDE RANGE, INCLUDING PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING FIRE POWER, STRATEGIC THEORY, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS. ALTHOUGH ALLIED REPS DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE POINTS EAST HAD MADE, THEY HAD NOT CONVINCED ALLIED REPS THAT THEY SHOULD CHANGE THE ATTITUDE THEY HAD EXPRESSED TO EAST WHEN PARTICIPANTS LAST MET.

7. BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED, THERE WERE THREE ELEMENTS IN WESTERN THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT. FIRST, PARTICIPANTS' TASK WAS TO TAKE THE ESSENTIAL STEPS TO REDUCE, AND IF POSSIBLE ELIMINATE, THE RISK OF HOSTILITIES BREAKING OUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THIS RISK ARISES FROM THE IMBALANCE WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES.

8. SECOND, IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES BREAKING OUT, THE IMPORTANT THRESHOLD WOULD BE BETWEEN THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL AND THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BOTH SIDES WOULD WISH TO DO EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO AVOID HAVING RECOURSE TO THE LATTER. BUT, SINCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WERE CLOSELY LINKED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BOTH TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC, LOCATED OUTSIDE THE AREAS OF REDUCTIONS, THOSE WITHIN THE AREA COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION. REDUCING SUCH WEAPONS WOULD NOT AVOID THE PROBLEM OF THE THRESHOLD. WHAT PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO AVOID WAS THE OUT-BREAK OF ANY CONFLICT BECAUSE IT COULD ESCALATE TO THE POINT WHERE BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE DECISION WHETHER TO CROSS THIS THRESHOLD. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS WAS TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE POTENTIAL SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN THE AREA, WHICH WAS THE PRESENT
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IMBALANCE BETWEEN GROUND FORCES.

9. THIRD ELEMENT OF WESTERN THINKING WAS THE QUESTION OF AIR FORCES. ALLIED REPS HAD EXPLAINED TO EAST ALLIED VIEW THAT THE MOBILITY OF AIRCRAFT, WHICH ENABLES THEM TO MOVE QUICKLY AND READILY IN AND OUT OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, MEANT THAT THEIR WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT STABILIZING FACTOR IN

MILITARY TERMS. THERE WERE, MOREOVER, THE PROBLEMS OF COMPARABILITY AND AGREEING ON INVENTORIES. ALLIES HAD NOT ACCEPTED THAT, AS EAST HAD CONTENDED, THIS WOULD BE AN EASY PROBLEM TO RESOLVE. ONE HAD ONLY TO LOOK AT THE ENORMOUS VARIETY OF TYPES OF AIRCRAFT IN OPERATION IN THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES, AND THE VARIED DESCRIPTIONS OF THEIR ROLES GIVEN IN PUBLISHED WORKS, TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTY. IF PARTICIPANTS WERE TO HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF REACHING EARLY AGREEMENT, THEY SHOULD, IN WESTERN VIEW, AVOID COMPLICATING THE TASK AND INSTEAD CONCENTRATE ON THE POINT OF REAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF STABILITY, NAMELY THE EXISTING IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES.

10. AT LAST MEETING, PROFESSOR KHLESTOV HAD SUGGESTED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN POINTS IN COMMON BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS. HE HAD SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THEIR ARMED FORCES. SIMILARLY, BOTH SIDES ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THEIR AIR FORCES. ALLIES AGREED WITH THIS. ALLIES HAD POINTED OUT ALSO THAT BOTH SIDES ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THEIR GROUND FORCES. AFTER ALL, PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY DEVOTED THREE SESSIONS TO DISCUSSING THESE FORCES. WHEREAS, THEREFORE, BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE IN THEIR ARMED FORCES OF ALL THESE THREE ELEMENTS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM WAS THAT, IN WESTERN VIEW -- FOR THE REASONS HE HAD STATED -- THE RISK OF CONFLICT, WHICH IT WAS MUTUAL TASK TO TRY TO REMOVE, ARISES IN CONNECTION WITH GROUND FORCES, RATHER THAN FROM EITHER OF THE OTHER TWO ELEMENTS, AND IT WAS THEREFORE ON THESE FORCES THAT EFFORTS SHOULD CONCENTRATE.

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11. ALLIED REPS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN PROFESSOR KHLESTOV'S REMARKS AT LAST MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT. THEY HAD NOTED HIS VIEW THAT, WHEN SPEAKING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF GLOBAL WAR, PLANNERS ON BOTH SIDES HAD TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ALL MILITARY ELEMENTS, THAT IS, ALL THE THREE ELEMENTS UK REP HAD MENTIONED. HE HAD SAID THAT SUCH AUTHORITIES THEREFORE TOOK ACCOUNT OF THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES ON A GLOBAL BASIS AND THAT NO MILITARY PLANNERS WOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ENTIRE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES. THIS WAS A VIEW ALLIES COULD SHARE AND ONE MIGHT THEREFORE SAY THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER POINT OF COMMON GROUND BETWEEN

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PARTICIPANTS. HOWEVER, PARTICIPANTS MOVED ON TO RATHER MORE DEBATABLE GROUND WHEN CONSIDERING PROFESSOR KHLESTOV'S NEXT PROPOSITION, WHICH WAS THAT, WHEN CONSIDERING CENTRAL EUROPE ALONE, ONE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES PRESENT THERE AS WOULD BE DONE IN ANY ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC WAR OUTSIDE THE AREA. THIS IDEA SEEMED TO UNDERLINE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. NUCLEAR FORCES, WHETHER INSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS OR OUTSIDE, MUST BE CONSIDERED IN A CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL SITUATION AND, WHEN CONSIDERING THE MILITARY UTILITY OF SUCH WEAPONS AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT, MILITARY PLANNERS AND OTHER AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS.

12. UK REP SAID THAT, HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT TASK HERE

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TO EXAMINE SUCH IMPLICATIONS. TASK OF PARTICIPANTS WAS RATHER TO DEAL WITH THE POTENTIAL POINTS OF CONFLICT IN A SPECIFIC AND LIMITED GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THE EAST REASONS WHY THESE WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE IMBALANCE OF GROUND FORCES AND THUS WHY IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CONCENTRATE ON THESE FORCES, WHICH DIRECTLY CONFRONT ONE ANOTHER IN THE CENTER OF THE AREA. HE HAD ALSO EXPLAINED THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE RISK OF AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES ARISING FROM THIS CONFRONTATION WAS THE

WAY TO AVOID THE RISK OF ESCALATION TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONSIDERATION OF WHICH WOULD BRING INTO PLAY ALL THOSE PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE GLOBAL BALANCE WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED ARE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME REMARKS IN RETURN. IN ALL THAT HE HAD JUST HEARD, HE HAD DETECTED ONLY ONE POSITIVE ELEMENT FOR THE DISCUSSION. THIS WAS THE POINT THAT, AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSION IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION, ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD RECOGNIZED THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES HAD AS GREAT OR GREATER IMPORTANCE AS GROUND FORCES. SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF BOTH PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL NATURE AROSE FROM THE POINTS MADE BY UK REP. THE VIEWS HE HAD EXPRESSED WERE OF A BROAD AND GENERAL NATURE. THEY WERE ALSO DEBATABLE, PARTICULARLY THE UK REP'S ARGUMENT THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD START WITH THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. ONE COULD ARGUE THIS DEBATABLE THESIS ENDLESSLY FROM BOTH SIDES. IF THE DELEGATES WERE PARTICIPATING IN A SCIENTIFIC SEMINAR, DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC MIGHT LEGITIMATELY BE PURSUED. AND THE SAME ABSTRACT VIEWPOINTS WOULD PROBABLY BE REPRESENTED WHETHER THE SEMINAR WERE HELD IN WASHINGTON, LONDON OR MOSCOW. THESE ISSUES COULD BE ARGUED ENDLESSLY. IT WAS WHOLLY EVIDENT THAT ALL OF THESE ARGUMENTS WERE SPECULATIVE AND DEBATABLE. HIS OWN CONCLUSION FROM ALL THIS WAS THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD A PRACTICAL TASK BEFORE THEM, TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF THIS TYPE WAS MERELY AN OBSTRUCTION TO PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

IF ALL PLENARIES AND INFORMAL SESSIONS WERE FILLED UP WITH SUCH THEORETICAL DISCUSSION, THIS WOULD DIVERT FROM THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

14. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HIS OWN EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INDICATED THAT ATTEMPTS TO FIND COMMON GROUND ON THEORETICAL ISSUES WERE USEFUL ONLY WHEN ONE HAD A PRACTICAL OUTCOME IN MIND. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, THERE HAD BEEN LONG DRAWN-OUT EFFORT TO DEFINE THE COMMON INHERITANCE OF MANKIND IN THE OCEANS AND SEABEDS. THIS HAD BEEN A PROTRACTED AND ARID DISCUSSION WITHOUT PRACTICAL OUTCOME. FROM THE PRACTICAL VIEW-POINT, HE SAW NO BENEFIT IN GIVING CAREFUL ANALYSIS TO THESE THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS. THE JOB OF THE NEGOTIATORS WAS A PRACTICAL ONE. SO, FOR HIS PART, HE WOULD AVOID THESE THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND WOULD CONCENTRATE ON PRACTICAL ISSUES. THE FIRST ONE HE WISHED TO RAISE WAS TO EXPLAIN WHY HE CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIED REPS HAD RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES FOR THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS. THIS WAS BECAUSE, IF ONE WERE TO LISTEN TO ALLIED STATEMENTS IN PLENARY SESSIONS, ONE COULD GAIN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FORCES IN THE AREA ARE THE GROUND FORCES AND THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WERE OF SECONDARY, EVEN TERTIARY IMPORTANCE, THE ONE POSITIVE RESULT OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS WAS THE AFFIRMATION THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND THAT NO ONE WAS GOING TO TRY TO REFUTE THIS. ONE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THESE SESSIONS WAS THAT NOW EVERYONE ACCEPTED THIS POINT.

15. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO PASS ON TO ANOTHER QUESTION. HAVING RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ALLIED REPS NONETHELESS CONTINUED TO ADVANCE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM REDUCTIONS. ONE COULD ARGUE THIS ISSUE TOO FOR A LONG TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, ALLIED

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REPS ASSERTED THAT AIR FORCE REDUCTIONS WERE NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE AIRCRAFT STATIONED OUTSIDE THE AREA COULD BE USED TO STRIKE TARGETS WITHIN IT. THIS WAS AN ARGUMENT DRAGGED IN BY THE HAIR. IT PLACED IN QUESTION THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING DELINEATED AND AGREED ON AN AREA FOR TROOP REDUCTIONS OR AS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE (SIC). THE HISTORY OF MANKIND HAD AGAIN AND AGAIN SHOWN THAT THE CREATION OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES WITH REDUCED TROOPS AND ARMAMENTS

HAD ALWAYS HAD POSITIVE EFFECTS. THE RECENT TREATY MAKING LATIN AMERICAN A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE WAS AN EXAMPLE. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT IT MARKED PROGRESS. NO ONE COULD INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THAT ZONE. BESIDES, ALLIED ARGUMENT WAS INCORRECT; SIMILAR ACTION COULD BE TAKEN JUST AS RAPIDLY BY WEAPONS LOCATED INSIDE THE ZONE ITSELF. THIS WAS TRUE OF ANY ZONE OF REDUCED WEAPONS. NONETHELESS, AS NOTED, IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED THAT THE CREATION OF ZONES WITH REDUCED WEAPONS OR OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES WAS A POSITIVE FACTOR. WHEN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO DELINEATE THE PRESENT ZONE OF NEGOTIATIONS, ALLIED REPS AND ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAD CLEARLY REALIZED THAT OTHER IMPORTANT WEAPONS WOULD BE LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE AND WOULD NOT BE TREATED OR DEALT WITH. NOTWITHSTANDING IT HAD BEEN CONSIDERED THAT THE CREATION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE A POSITIVE FACTOR IN AND OF ITSELF, EVEN THOUGH MANY WEAPONS REMAINED OUTSIDE ITS LIMITS.

16. KHLESTOV SAID, REGARDING ALLIED ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE WEAPONS THEMSELVES, IN PLEARNY SESSION ALLIED REPS HAD ASSERTED THAT TANKS WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT STRIKE WEAPON. BUT EASTERN MILITARY EXPERTS AND MANY WESTERN EXPERTS TOO BELIEVED THAT THE AIR FORCE WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE WEAPON. PARTICIPANTS COULD ARGUE THIS ONE OUT FOR A LONG TIME TOO. EASTRN REPS RECOGNIZED THAT PRESENT SESSIONS WERE A PLACE WHERE EITHER SIDE COULD OFFER ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSS THEN, BUT THE POINTS BROUGHT UP FOR DISCUSSION SHOULD CONTAIN SOME POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS. DESPITE THEIR RECOGNITION OF THE POINT THAT ARMED FORCES CONSISTED OF SEPARATE COMPONENTS MAKING UP AN INTEGRAL

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WHOLE, ALLIED REPS PERSISTED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PUSH ASIDE THE AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. BECAUSE IT WAS

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NOT GOOD FORM IN THE PRESENT CIRCLES TO SAY NO OUT-
RIGHT, ALLIED REPS WERE OFFERING OTHER ARGUMENTS
IN ORDER TO CONCEAL THEIR RELUCTANCE. THIS PRACTICE
WAS A BAD ONE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS: THE AGREED
COMMUNIQUE CLEARLY STATED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD COVER
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS,
NONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS HAD CLAIMED THAT THE TERM
"ARMED FORCES" MEANT ONLY GROUND FORCES. IN THE RUSSIAN
LANGUAGE AND IN ALL OTHER LANGUAGES USED IN PRESENT
NEGOTIATIONS, THE TERM "ARMED FORCES" WAS A COLLECTIVE
ONE INDICATING THAT ALL ARMED FORCES WERE COMPREHENDED
UNDER IT. IN NORMAL VOCABULARY, IF ONE OF THE OTHER
BRANCH OF THE SERVICE WAS UNDER DISCUSSION, THE
NAVY OR AIR FORCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THIS WOULD BE SPECIFIED.
BUT IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD
ACTED UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL ARMED FORCES IN
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ZONE WOULD BE COVERED BY REDUCTIONS.

17. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT HE WOULD NOT REFER TO
UNOFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS DURING THE PREPARATORY
TALKS, BUT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT ALL DELEGATES HAD HAD
A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NAVY WOULD NOT BE
REDUCED. THERE WERE NO DOCUMENTS ON THIS, BUT ALL
WERE CLEAR THAT THE NAVY WAS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF

REDUCTIONS. SO NOW AT THIS POINT, WHEN ALLIED REPS WERE SAYING THEY HAD IN MIND ONLY REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES, THIS CONFLICTED WITH THEIR OWN EARLIER POSITION. HE WANTED TO BE FRANK ABOUT THIS MATTER. WHEN THESE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AT THE TIME OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD HAD THE UNDERSTANDING HE DESCRIBED. IN HIS VIEW, THE ALLIES WERE NOW CHANGING THEIR POSITION. THIS FAILED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. WHY WERE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES TAKING A DIFFERENT POSITION NOW? AFTER ALL, ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD A CLEAR ASSESSMENT OF THEIR OWN OF THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THOSE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SO IT WAS REALLY NO ACCIDENT THAT ALLIED REPS WERE TRYING TO KEEP AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE ALLIES WERE SEEKING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE. THE ALLIED NOTION THAT THE GROUND FORCES WERE THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOURCE OF CONFLICT WAS AN ARTIFICIAL CONCEPT. IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE TO CONCERT EFFORTS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN A SEARCH FOR POINTS WHICH WOULD HELP MAKE REAL PROGRESS. SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF, HE WAS WHOLLY RELUCTANT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THEORETICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH NO BEARING ON THE SUBJECT IN HAND.

18. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT ALLIED REPS HAD CLAIMED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO COMPARE AIR FORCES. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE TASK BEFORE PARTICIPANTS WAS A DIFFICULT ONE. ITS MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT WAS TO FIND AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION. DESPITE ALL THE POINTS THE ALLIED REPS HAD MADE, THE QUESTION REMAINED, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO FIND ACCEPTABLE PROPORTIONS FOR AIR

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FORCE REDUCTIONS? HE BELIEVED THIS QUITE POSSIBLE EVEN IF IT TOOK A LONG TIME. IF IT WERE IMPOSSIBLE, THEN HOW COULD ONE COMPARE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF GROUND FORCES? HOW COULD ONE COMPARE INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE HIGHLY TRAINED, OTHERS OF WHOM WERE NOT, SOME OF WHOM WERE COURAGEOUS AND SOME NOT? HISTORICALLY, THERE HAD BEEN MANY DIFFERENT APPRAISALS OF THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF MANY DIFFERENT ARMIES. ONE SHOULD TRY TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. THEREFORE, IF ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES WERE IMPORTANT, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD LOOK FOR AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. IF IT WERE TOO DIFFICULT TO DEFINE LARGE-SCALE REDUCTIONS OF THESE

ELEMENTS IN A DRAFT AGREEMENT, THEN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO FIND SOME INITIAL STEPS WHICH WOULD ENABLE ALL PARTICIPANTS AT LEAST TO HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS INVOLVED AND ENABLE THEM TO WORK OUT CRITERIA FOR USE IN FUTURE REDUCTIONS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MOVE ALONG ON PRACTICAL ROAD IN THIS FIELD TOO, STARTING WITH SOMETHING SMALL IF NECESSARY.

19. US REP NOTED THAT KHLESTOV HAD SAID HE WAS RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS WITH NO PRACTICAL OUTCOME. US REP AGREED WITH THIS VIEW. PROBLEM FACED BY PARTICIPANTS WAS A COMPLEX ONE. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAKE SOME ANALYSIS OF IT NOW IN ORDER TO REACH A SIGNIFICANT RESULT IN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, RESULTS WITH REAL IMPACT. HE BELIEVED THE AREA OF GREATEST INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE COULD BE FOUND IN THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON THIS SUBJECT. ANALYSIS IDENTIFYING THIS PROBLEM AREA AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE WAS SUPPORTED BY WRITERS AND EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES. MILITARY WRITERS AND EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES SAID THAT THE MOST LIKELY WAY THAT WAR MIGHT START IN EUROPE WAS BY CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. AS PRACTICAL EVIDENCE FOR THIS CONTENTION, HE COULD ADD THAT THE SAME EXPERTS AND WRITERS POINT TO THE VIEW THAT EXERCISES HELD BOTH
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BY NATO AND BY THE WARSAW PACT GENERALLY BEGIN WITH THE SO-CALLED OPENING PHASE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. THESE EXPERTS SAID THAT SUCH EXERCISES ONLY LATER TURNED TO POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SO THIS ISSUE WAS NOT PARTICULARLY DEBATABLE AND WAS A VERY PRACTICAL ONE.

20. KHLESTOV SAID THE QUESTION RAISED BY US REP WAS INDEED A DEBATABLE ONE. THE ISSUE WAS FAR FROM AGREED OR CLEAR FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN MILITARY EXPERTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT IN NATO THERE WAS A ONE-MINUTE ALERT FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATIONED IN THE FRG, WEAPONS WHICH COULD BE DELIVERED BY BOTH AIR AND GROUND FORCES. THIS INFORMATION WAS PUBLISHED.

21. US REP SAID BASIS OF ALERT WAS TO DETER SURPRISE ATTACK BY CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED, WHERE WAS THE ELEMENT OF ESCALATION AND JUDGMENT AND FURTHER DECISION WITH SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME? US REP SAID THE SHORT PERIOD OF TIME WAS FOR CREDIBLE DETERRENCE

AGAINST ATTACK. UK REP SAID THAT EASTERN REPS WERE MIXING TWO SEPARATE SUBJECTS. ONE CONTENTION WAS THAT ONE OF THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT UNWISELY MAKE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE OTHER POINT WAS THAT, IN ORDER TO KEEP WEAPONS READY FOR EVENT OF ATTACK BY THE OTHER SIDE, THEY WERE KEPT ON ALERT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN GOVERNMENTS FELT THERE WAS REAL DANGER THAT WAR COULD START WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT THIS POSSIBILITY COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED.

22. US REP SAID THAT AS PRACTICAL MEN, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DEAL WITH THE MOST PROBABLE SITUATION. SMIRNOVSKY RETORTED THAT EVEN AN EVENTUALITY OR CHANCE OF 10 OR 15 PERCENT HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE CONCENTRATION OF A GREAT NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS IN ITSELF A

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SOURCE OF TENSION AND A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF CONFLICT. EVERYONE KNEW THAT THERE WERE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA

WITH A ONE OR TWO-MINUTE ALERT TIME. EASTERN MILITARY WRITERS EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE AND DANGER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA AND STATED THAT WAR COULD START WITH THEM. THE WESTERN THESIS WAS THAT WAR WHICH STARTED WITH A CONVENTIONAL PHASE COULD ESCALATE TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WHERE WAS THE ESCALATION PERIOD IN THE CASE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS READY FOR USE WITHIN A SINGLE MINUTE?

23. US REP SAID THE PURPOSE OF ALERT STATUS WAS DETERRENCE. IT WAS NONETHELESS TRUE THAT MOST WRITERS BELIEVED THAT WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD START WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. BUT IF THERE WAS IN FACT ONLY A 5 PERCENT CHANCE OF WAR STARTING WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THIS RISK WOULD NOT BE MUCH EFFECTED BY REDUCTION OF A FEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE AREA.

24. SMIRNOVSKY RESPONDED THAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS ISSUE
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WOULD BE THE INDICATION OF POLITICAL WILL ON BOTH SIDES RESULTING FROM REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ALLIES CLAIMED THERE SHOULD BE NO REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCES. THEY PEGGED THEIR ARGUMENT ON AIR FORCE MOBILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF USE OF AIRCRAFT FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. BUT EASTERN MILITARY EXPERTS HAD POINTED OUT THAT ALL WESTERN AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA WERE OFFENSIVELY ORIENTED.

25. UK REP SAID KHESTOV'S REFERENCES TO DEMILITARIZED ZONES HAD BEEN QUITE PUZZLING. THERE WERE IN FACT A NUMBER OF HISTORICAL EXAMPLES WHICH SHOWED SUCH ZONES HAD BEEN FAILURES. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT DEMILITARIZED ZONES, BUT REDUCTION OF CONFRONTATION. NO ONE IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS HAD SPOKEN OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES TO WHICH WHOLLY DIFFERENT MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS APPLIED. THE TERM DID NOT APPLY TO THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

26. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT KHESTOV'S REMARK ON DEMILITARIZED ZONE HAD BEEN A REFERENCE OF GENERAL NATURE. IT HAD BEEN LOOSELY USED AS AN ILLUSTRATION TO SHOW THAT HISTORY CONSIDERED THAT MOVES TOWARD CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF WEAPONS TO HAVE BEEN PROGRESS. BUT, AFTER ALL, THERE HAD BEEN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS LIMITING IF NOT REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND OTHER AGREEMENTS ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH AGREEMENTS DOCUMENTED AN INTENTION TO LIMIT AND IF POSSIBLE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GIVEN THE FACT OF THESE AGREEMENTS, THERE WAS NO REASON TO SEEK TO EXCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

27. UK REP SAID HE TOOK IT FROM THESE POINTS THAT THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IDEA WAS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

STRULAK SAID MENTION OF THE PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOCUMENTED THE CONCERN OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE AREA THAT THE CONCENTRATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS DANGEROUS AND COULD LEAD TO CONFLICT. ONE COULD NOT SIMPLY TELL PUBLIC OPINION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE NOT DANGEROUS. THE CONCERN OF THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC ABOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS INTENSE AND WIDESPREAD, ESPECIALLY ON THE PART OF THOSE IN PROXIMITY TO CONCENTRATIONS OF SUCH WEAPONS.

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28. CZECHOSLOVAK REP KLEIN SAID HE HAD READ MANY PAPERS OF WESTERN MILITARY PLANNERS. THEY CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THE POSSIBLE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ENTAILED REAL DANGERS FOR CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY SHOWED THAT THE TERRITORY OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE COVERED WITH STRIKES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT NOT THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION COULD START GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR. WESTERN PLANNERS HAD INDEED CONTENDED THAT WAR COULD START WITH A TACTICAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE AND AFTER FIRST USE THERE MIGHT BE NEGOTIATIONS TO SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT. THESE WEAPONS WERE ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEREFORE IT WAS ESPECIALLY APPROPRIATE TO REDUCE THESE WEAPONS IN AN AREA WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STOCKPILED FOR USE WITHIN IT.

29. STRULAK SAID EASTERN EXPERTS HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE COMBAT READINESS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING AIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, WAS MUCH HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE GROUND FORCES. IN ALLIED PROPOSALS TO DEAL ONLY WITH GROUND FORCES, THIS WHOLE SYSTEM WAS LEFT UNCHANGED. THESE FORCES MUST BE REDUCED OR VOTED IN SOME WAY. IT WOULD BE COMPLETELY MISUNDERSTOOD OF THEY WERE OMITTED.

30. BELGIAN REP SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY KHLESTOV'S REFERENCE TO A DEMILITARIZED ZONE. AT FIRST SIGHT, THIS WAS A TEMPTING IDEA. THE POLES HAD RAISED IT IN THE PAST. BUT OF COURSE, THERE WAS AN ENORMOUS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A GENUINE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND WHAT THE PARTICIPANTS WERE DOING HERE. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE TRYING TO FIND PRACTICAL, STEP BY STEP METHODS TO AVOID WAR THROUGH RECTIFYING AN IMBALANCE. A REAL DEMILITARIZED ZONE WOULD CREATE A MILITARY
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FROM US REP MBFR

POSSIBILITY WAS THAT WAR WOULD START WITH THE NUCLEAR
EXCHANGE AND THAT THE WAY TO AVOID THIS WAS TO MAKE A SMALL
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES.

31. KLEIN SAID THAT MANY WRITERS ON THE SUBJECT
BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE MORE THAN ENOUGH NUCLEAR
WARHEADS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IF THIS WERE SO, WHY
COULDN'T PARTICIPANTS START WITH REDUCTION OF
SMALL NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY
SYSTEMS? SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD CREATE MORE UNDER-
STANDING AND A BETTER CLIMATE FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT.
PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MOVE STEP BY STEP.

32. US REP SAID HE AGREED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MOVE
AHEAD STEP BY STEP. THE ISSUE WAS WHICH STEP WOULD
BE THE MOST PRACTICAL. KLEIN SAID HE BELIEVED A

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SMALL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE SUCH
A PRACTICAL STEP. BELGIAN REP SAID ONE SHOULD NOT
DEAL WITH THE SYMPTOMS BUT WITH THE DISEASE. STRULAK
SAID HE AGREED PARTICIPANTS HAD TO START SOMEWHERE
WITH REDUCTIONS, BUT IT WOULD BE VERY BAD IF THEY
LEFT A LOOPHOLE WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD INCREASE.
SMALL REDUCTIONS WOULD AT LEAST INDICATE THE WILL

OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO START ON A NEW RELATIONSHIP.
THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR AIR FORCES AS WELL. A
REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT WHICH OMITTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND AIR FORCES WOULD BE AN ILLUSION.

33. BELGIAN REP SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK TO
DECREASE THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
WOULD BE USED, RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON TRYING TO PRODUCE A
FAVORABLE PUBLIC IMPRESSION. KLEIN SAID A SMALL
INITIAL STEP WOULD AT LEAST SHOW THAT PARTICIPANTS
TOOK THE ISSUE SERIOUSLY. STRULAK SAID EASTERN
REPS ACCEPTED THAT ALLIES WISHED TO CREATE A
SITUATION WHERE THERE WOULD BE NO STIMULUS OR
INCENTIVE TO INCREASE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF THEY
REALLY MEANT THIS, WHY WERE NOT ALLIES WILLING TO
INCLUDE MEASURES AGAINST THEIR INCREASE ALONG WITH
REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES?

34 SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN REPS DID NOT ACCEPT
WESTERN ANALYSIS THAT THE MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY
IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS IMBALANCE IN THE GROUND
FORCES. EASTERN REPS DID NOT OMIT GROUND FORCES
FROM THEIR REDUCTIONS PROPOSALS, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL
TO INCLUDE OTHER FORCE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA ALSO.
US REP NOTED THAT SMIRNOVSKY HAD AGREED THAT THERE
WERE ELEMENTS OF INSTABILITY IN THE SITUATION IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. WHAT WAS THE SOURCE OF THIS
INSTABILITY IF IT WERE NOT IMBALANCE IN GROUND
FORCES?

35. UK REP SAID THAT THE MOST PRACTICAL STEP
PARTICIPANTS COULD TAKE WAS TO ELIMINATE THE
POSSIBLE CAUSE OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN THE AREA.
IN AN AGE OF NUCLEAR PARITY THERE WAS ON ALL

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SIDES INCREASING EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL GROUND
FORCES. DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE WAS THEREFORE
THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE
THRESHOLD DECISIONS BECAME NECESSARY. PARTICIPANTS
SHOULD SEEK TO CRETE A SITUATION WHERE THESE
DECISIONS WERE NOT NECESSARY.

36. US REP SAID ALLIES RECOGNIZED THAT EASTERN
REPS INCLUDED GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR
PROPOSALS BUT THEY HAD SUGGESTED A REDUCTION
METHOD WHICH DID NOT MOVE THE SITUATION TOWARDS
THE STABILITY WHICH COMES FROM EQUILIBRIUM.
SMIRNOVSKY SAID THERE SHOULD BE AN EQUILIBRIUM
OF ALL FORCES. KLEIN SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD
SPEAK ONLY ABOUT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS INSIDE

THE AREA. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE NOT BEING DISCUSSED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. UK REP ASKED CZECH REP HOW HE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA AND THOSE STATIONED OUTSIDE.

37. KLEIN SAID THAT THERE WERE GROUND AND AIR FORCES BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE AREA AS WELL AS NUCLEAR FORCES. BUT THE MAIN POINT WAS THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO DEAL WITH FORCES INSIDE THE AREA. UK REP SAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUTSIDE AND INSIDE THE AREA WAS NOT THE SAME FOR AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES AS IT WAS FOR GROUND FORCES. CZECH REP SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MENTION OF ANY SPECIFIC TYPE OF ARMED FORCES IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THERE HAD BEEN NO EFFORT TO DISTINGUISH ONE FROM THE OTHER ON ANY POSSIBLE BASIS. THE EASTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD JUST ASSUMED THAT ALL FORCES WERE INCLUDED. THESE GOVERNMENTS WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE WESTERN POSITION.

38. US REP POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE MAY 14 PLENARY AND THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE REGARDING THE TITLE OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WERE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM

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OF EITHER SIDE. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS TRUE THAT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS TO LIMIT REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES ALONE, NEITHER HAD THERE BEEN ANY COMMITMENT BY ANYONE TO REDUCE AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. IN FACT THE COMMUNIQUE WAS SILENT ON THIS POINT. IT HAD BEEN LEFT TO BOTH SIDES TO RAISE THEIR PARTICULAR INTERESTS IN THIS REGARD AND FOR THEM TO BE DISCUSSED, AS WAS BEING DONE ON THE PRESENT OCCASION. WESTERN REPS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE POINTS RAISED BY THE EASTN BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE AIR OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. STRULAK SAID THE TERM ARMAMENTS IN THE COMMUNIQUE CLEARLY MEANT ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA. NO SPECIFIC EXCLUSION HAD EITHER BEEN SUGGESTED OR MADE.

39. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS WESTERN ATTEMPTS TO LINK AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WITH SIMILAR FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WAS NOT THE RIGHT ROW TO HOE. IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THERE WERE US WEAPONS OUTSIDE THE

CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA, FOR EXAMPLE, US AIR FORCES
BASED IN THE UK AIMED AT THE TERRITORY OF THE
SOVIET UNION. BUT IT HAD BEEN AGREED NOT TO
SPEAK OF ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE ZONE. THEREFORE, IF
EFFORTS WERE NOW BEING MADE TO ATTEMPT TO CONNECT

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FROM US REP MBFR

WEAPONS INSIDE THE ZONE WITH WEAPONS OUTSIDE IT,
THIS WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE
REFERENCE IN THE AGREED AGENDA MENTIONED IN THE
COMMUNIQUE WAS ONLY TO FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
INSIDE THE AREA. IF ADDITIONAL FORCES WERE ADDED
THIS WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE THE ISSUE. ONCE
PARTICIPANTS HAD AGREED ON REDUCING FORCES INSIDE
A SPECIFIC AREA, THEY SHOULD CONTINUE ON THIS ROAD.
THEREFORE, WHEN UK REP STATED THAT BOTH SIDES
TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE MILITARY COMPONENTS OUTSIDE
THE AREA THIS WAS NOT RIGHT. PARTICIPANTS WERE

DISCUSSING REDUCTION OF FORCES WITHIN A SPECIFIC ZONE. THEY SHOULD STICK TO THAT. THE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS HOW TO REDUCE FORCES WITHIN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS SPECIFIED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

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40. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, NATURALLY, WHEN ONE WAS CONSIDERING THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES INSIDE A SPECIFIED ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, COMMON SENSE INDICATED THAT ONE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ARMED FORCES INSIDE THAT ZONE. PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT CALLED ON TO DETERMINE THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT ON A GLOBAL SCALE. THIS WAS NOT THE ASSIGNED TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS ELEMENT HAD ONLY BEEN INTRODUCED ARTIFICIALLY WHEN THE EAST HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ONLY CORRECT APPLICATION OF THIS ISSUE WAS IN HOW TO EVALUATE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY OF FORCES INSIDE THE AREA. SINCE IT WAS NOT THE TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ESTIMATE THE GLOBAL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF THE TWO AREAS, THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON WHAT COULD BE REDUCED WITHIN THE SPECIFIED ZONE.

41. KHLESTOV SAID HE FELT ALLIED REPS HAD ATTACHED TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO HIS MENTION OF A DEMILITARIZED ZONE. HE DID NOT WISH ALLIED REPS TO UNDERSTAND THROUGH THIS REFERENCE THAT SOVIET UNION WISHED TO CONVERT CENTRAL EUROPE INTO A DEMILITARIZED ZONE. TO THE CONTRARY, HE HAD MERELY WISHED TO MAKE THE POINT THAT A REDUCTION OF ARMS HAD ALWAYS BEEN HISTORICALLY CONSIDERED A GOOD THING. AS REGARDS US REPS INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNIQUE, THIS WAS INCORRECT. THE COMMUNIQUE SPECIFIED REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THIS FORMULATION MEANT THE SAME IN ENGLISH AS IN RUSSIAN. ARMED FORCES WAS A BROAD TERM MEANING MILITARY FORCES IN GENERAL. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS HAD USED THIS GENERALLY ACCEPTED TERM IN THIS WAY TO DISCUSS ARMED FORCES IN GENERAL.

42. US REP ASKED KHLESTOV WHETHER IF THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT TO WESTERN PROPOSAL, WAS IT NOT A FACT THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN HAVE "REDUCED ARMED FORCES?" KHLESTOV AGREED THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN ALLIED REPS INTERPRETED THE TITLE OF THE NEGOTIA-
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TIONS AS EXCLUDING ITS APPLICATION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AIR FORCES, THIS CONFLICTED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. US REP SAID KHLESTOV MISUNDERSTOOD HIS POINT. HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE TITLE HAD LEFT IT OPEN FOR PARTICIPANTS TO DECIDE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER WHAT WEAPONS WOULD BE INCLUDED.

43. KHLESTOV INSISTED THAT THE TITLE COMPRISED ALL WEAPONS. THE WORD "ARMAMENTS" MEANT ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS. HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT, FOR THE COUNTRIES LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE CONCENTRATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE WAS FAR MORE DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTS OF THESE WEAPONS. HENCE THE LEGITIMATE CONCERN OF THESE COUNTRIES FOR REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IF ONE STARTED WITH A SMALL REDUCTION, THERE WOULD BE NO PREJUDICE TO THE COMBAT CAPABILITY OF EITHER SIDE. TWO PRINCIPLES WOULD BE MAINTAINED AS REGARDS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AS THE REDUCTION IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD HARM NO ONE ESPECAILLY IF IT WERE ON A SMALL SCALE. BUT EVEN A SMALL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD PREVENT A BUILD-UP OF THESE WEAPONS IN THE AREA. IT WOULD STIMULATE MILITARY DETENTE. IF THE US AND USSR SHOULD MAKE AN EXAMPLE, AS URGED BY ALLIED REPS, LET THEM MAKE IT IN THIS AREA. A SMALL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD DO NO HARM TO THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. IF THE REDUCTIONS WERE KEPT SMALL, THE ENTIRE ISSUE SHOULD REMAIN A MANAGEABLE PROBLEM. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND COMPARABLE NUCLEAR LAUNCHERS OR INSTALLATIONS WHICH COULD BE REDUCED ON BOTH SIDES. THIS WOULD HAVE INTRINSIC VALUE AND WOULD HAVE MARKED GOOD EFFECT ON HTHE PROGRESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

44. US REP COMMENTED THAT KLEIN HAD JUST IMPLIED THAT TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORED IN THE AREA WERE OF GREATER CONCERN TO COUNTRIES IN THE AREA AND OF LESSER CONCERN TO THE US AND SOVIET UNION. THE US FELT THAT THESE
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WEAPONS WERE OF GREAT CONCERN TO IT BECAUSE, ONCE THE DEVELOPMENT MOVED ON TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHERE THE NEXT THRESHOLD OR STOPPING PLACE WAS LOCATED.

THEREFORE, US WAS EQUALLY INVOLVED WITH EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS. HE BELIEVED IT WAS WORTH SPENDING SOME TIME IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY SOMETHING REALLY EFFECTIVE WHICH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE BELIEVED THIS WAS THE NEED TO ESTABLISH EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCES OF BOTH SIDES.

45. UK REP SAID THIS WAS WHY IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY IT WOULD REALLY HELP TO HAVE A SMALL SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA. IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW THIS WOULD HELP THE PRACTICAL SITUATION. CZECH REP'S SUGGESTION THAT ONE COULD SEPARATE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS INSIDE THE AREA FROM THOSE OUTSIDE IT OR FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS SEEMED TO HIM TO CONTAIN A DANGEROUS THOUGHT. IF THESE WEAPONS WERE EFFECTIVELY SEPARATED AND THERE WAS A CLEAR POSSIBILITY OF CONTROL OF ESCALATION, ONE COULD HOPE FOR THIS. BUT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN CLEAR THAT THE REAL THRESHOLD WAS THAT BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ALSO CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DIFFICULT TO DETENE IN ADVANCE WHERE ESCALATION WOULD STOP. THE IDEA THAT ONE COULD ARREST THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION AND CONTAIN IT WITHIN THE AREA SEEMED TO HIM TO HAVE A RATHER DANGEROUS CONNOTATION NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORMAL STRATEGIC VIEWS. STRULAK ASKED WHETHER UK REP MEANT TO SAY THAT IF A LIMIT WERE PLACED ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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FROM US REP MBFR

INSIDE THE AREA, THEN THIS WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION THERE MORE DANGEROUS THAN IT WAS AT PRESENT? UK REP SAID HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING THIS, BUT RATHER THE IDEA THAT ONE COULD CONTAIN ESCALATION WITHIN THE AREA. ONE COULD NOT OPERATE ON THIS ASSUMPTION.

46. STRULAK SAID THIS WAS THE SAME POINT UK REP HAD BEEN MAKING ABOUT THE CONNECTION OF FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA WITH THOSE INSIDE IT. HE HAD CHECKED INTO THE UK REPS IDEAS OF A THRESHOLD. ON THE LAST OCCASION, HE HAD ASKED THE UK REP WHICH LINK WAS STRONGER, THAT BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES INSIDE THE AREA, OR THE LINK BETWEEN TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES INSIDE THE AREA AND THOSE OUTSIDE IT. UK REP HAD MAINTAINED THE LATTER LINK WAS GREATER. TO THIS, UK REP REPLIED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THERE WAS NO CLEAR THRESHOLD BETWEEN THESE TWO CATEGORIES.

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47. STRULAK SAID THE QUESTION WAS ONE OF SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT INSIDE THE AREA. WESTERN ARTILLERY COULD BE USED WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. WESTERN MILITARY EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS PLANS KNOWN TO THE EAST SHOWED THAT THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS PART AND PARCEL OF OPERATIONS PLANS AT A LOW LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT OF GROUND FORCES. ACCORDING TO PRESENT WESTERN PLANS, CONFLICT IN THE AREA WAS BOUND TO BRING IN THE USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS WERE SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED TO TARGETS IN THE AREA. THE POLES KNEW THIS BECAUSE THEY WERE THE TARGETS. THEIR WHOLE AREA WAS COVERED WITH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE POLES WANTED LOWERE CONFRONTATION. THESE WEAPONS WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED TOO.

48. US REP SAID THE REAL WAY TO LOWER THE CONFRONTATION WAS BY ACHIEVING EQUILIBRIUM IN THE GROUND FORCES. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR BY NOW TO EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THAT EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT LOWER THE THRESHOLD OF CONFRONTATION. STRULAK SAID THAT, AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, TACTICAL

NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE REALLY THE MAIN PART OF THAT CONFRONTATION AND ITS MOST DANGEROUS PART. THEY COULD BE USED IN A MATTER OF MINUTES. THIS ELEMENT WAS LITERALLY HANGING IN THE AIR OVER THE HEADS OF EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. THE BELGIAN REP ASKED WHETHER WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WERE LESS THREATENED. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID NO, ALL EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WERE EQUALLY THREATENED. THEREFORE THESE WEAPONS SHOULD BE REDUCED.

49. UK REP SAID THAT ALLIED CONTENTION WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A VERY MAJOR DECISION TO START USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO FORESEE THE PROCESS OF CONTINUED ESCALATION UP THE SCALE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. EVEN IF THE EASTERN VIEWS WERE CORRECT, THE MAIN THING TO DO WAS TO PREVENT ANY CONFLICT FROM BREAKING OUT AND THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS WAS TO TACKLE THE GROUND FORCES. STRULAK SAID ALLIED REPS WERE URGING EAST TO AGREE TO REDUCE THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. BUT, NONETHELESS, THEY WISHED TO KEEP THE ALLIED DETERRENT UNCHANGED. WHY NOT PUT SOME LIMITATIONS ON THIS DETERRENT? UK REP SAID THAT ANY FORCES WERE A DETERRENT. THE DETERRENT VALUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD SHRINK FROM THEIR USE. ONE MUST TRY TO AVOID SITUATIONS WHERE RECOURSE MIGHT HAVE TO BE MADE TO THEM.

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50. KHLESTOV SAID IF GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED, THEN IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO REDUCE NUCLEAR FORCES TO THE SAME DEGREE, EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NATO STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. UK REP SAID ONE HAD TO START WITH THE MOST PRACTICAL AND URGENT ISSUES. KHLESTOV SAID IT WOULD BE MUCH BETTER TO REDUCE BOTH FORCES TOGETHER. STRULAK SAID TO DO SO WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE CONCERNS OF EVERYONE ON THE EASTERN SIDE. THE ALLIES COULD NOT BYPASS CONCERNS OF THE WHOLE GROUP OF EASTERN COUNTRIES AND EXPECT TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT. UK REP MENTIONED BELGIAN REP'S REFERENCE TO DANGERS OF MISLEADING PUBLIC OPINION. STRULAK RETORTED THAT ONE SHOULD FORGET PUBLIC OPINION FOR A MOMENT, AND INSTEAD TAKE THE ISSUE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF NATIONAL SECURITY. ALLIED REPS WANTED TO REDUCE WHAT THEY FEARED MIGHT ENTAIL THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT. BUT THEY WANTED TO LEAVE COMPLETELY UNTOUCHED THOSE ELEMENTS OF WESTERN COMBAT CAPABILITY WHICH WERE FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THE SOURCE OF THE THREAT.

51. SMIRNOVSKY SAID ALLIED REPS HAD CLAIMED THAT, IN THE EVENT GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED, THERE WOULD BE NO INCENTIVE FOR ANYONE TO INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES. BUT THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN WAS EQUALLY VALID: IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE REDUCED, THERE WOULD BE LESS INCENTIVE FOR OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE THEIR GROUND FORCES. HE AGREED THAT THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR WAS NOT OF CONCERN TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALONE BUT ALSO TO THE

US AND USSR. THIS WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON TO INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN REDUCTIONS. WHAT WERE THE WEST'S PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST DOING THIS? IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO DO IT, THEN A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO DO IT. PARTICIPANTS MORE OR LESS KNEW HOW MANY WARHEADS, MINES OR MISSILES THERE WERE ON BOTH SIDES. IT COULD BE DONE. THE WESTERN THEORY THAT THE MAIN RISK OF CONFLICT CAME FROM THE IMBALANCE OF GROUND FORCES WAS NOT SHARED BY THE EAST. IT WAS A FACT THAT WESTERN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE KEPT IN A STATE OF IMMEDIATE READINESS FOR USE. THE NUMERICAL SIZE OF GROUND FORCES DID NOT OF ITSELF MEAN THEY WOULD BE USED. EACH SIDE HAD FOR YEARS ESTIMATED THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE OTHER SIDE AND CONSTRUCTED ITW OWN ARMED FORCES ACCORDINGLY. THE END RESULT WAS A CORRELATION OF FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF THIS CORRELATION WERE DIFFERENT IN EACH

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CASE, BUT ONE COULD NOT TAKE OUT ONLY ONE OF THESE

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P 151533Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2024

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

ELEMENTS WITHOUT DISTURBING THE OVERALL BALANCE. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS. THEY HAD MORE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA AND WOULD TAKE NUMERICALLY MORE REDUCTIONS. BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO EXCLUDE THE NAVY. THIS EXCLUSION SHOWED THAT, BY AGREEMENT, THE REMAINING FORCES HAD BEEN SELECTED FOR CONSIDERATION.

52. US DEP REP SAID IF THE EASTERN ARGUMENT WAS TAKEN TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION, THE COMPLEX OF ARMED FORCES OF MODERN STATES DID OF COURSE INCLUDE A LARGE ARRAY OF FORCES. HOWEVER, BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, BOTH SIDES HAD EXCLUDED IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THESE FORCES FROM THE SCOPE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS SENSE, IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THOSE CONSIDERABLE FORCES WHICH LIE
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OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTION SHOULD NOT BE PART OF THE SUBJECT MATTER OF NEGOTIATION, AND IT HAD BEEN AGREED AS NOTED BY EASTERN REPS THAT NAVAL FORCES SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED. THEREFORE, IN ORDER BETTER TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED CERTAIN IMPORTANT FORCE ELEMENTS IN DEFINING THEIR SCOPE. IN THIS SENSE, IT WAS WHOLLY REASONABLE, IN THE INTEREST OF DEFINING A SCOPE OF NEGOTIATION WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE MOST DIRECTLY TO ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TO FOCUS ON THE KEY MILITARY ELEMENT CONNECTED WITH THIS PROBLEM. THIS MEANT REDUCING GROUND FORCES, BECAUSE IT WAS THE UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP IN GROUND FORCES WHICH WAS POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING.

53. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS A SIMPLE ARGUMENT. PARTICIPANTS IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS MIGHT JUST AS WELL HAVE WRITTEN INTO THE COMMUNIQUE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DEAL WITH GROUND FORCES ALONE. MOREOVER, ALLIED REFERENCES TO PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND TIME-CONSUMING EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT WERE DECIDEDLY A WEAK ARGUMENT. THESE WERE NOT REAL ANSWERS. TO INSIST THAT SOME FORCES WHICH CAUSED SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE EAST SHOULD BE

EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THEIR PROGRESS.

54. UK REP SAID SMIRNOVSKY HAD MADE REPEATED REFERENCES TO ONE MINUTE ALERT PREPARATION FOR ALLIED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THERE WAS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE READINESS STATE OF WEAPONS AND THE TIME TAKEN FOR DECISION TO USE THEM. THESE WERE TWO DIFFERENT POINTS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE CREDIBILITY OF A DETERRENT FORCE THAT IT BE READY FOR USE RAPIDLY. ITS READINESS DID NOT MEAN IT WOULD HAVE TO BE USED.

56. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THERE WERE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AIMED AT TARGETS IN THE AREA. WHY THIS SECRET

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ALERT STATE? THE ALLIED THEORY THAT THE MAIN SOURCE OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT WAS GROUND FORCE IMBALANCE WAS UNTENABLE. IF THE ALLIES INSISTED THAT, IF THE GROUND FORCES WERE REDUCED, THERE WOULD BE LESS INCENTIVE FOR INCREASE IN AIR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE REVERSE WAS ALSO TRUE. UK REP ASKED SMIRNOVSKY WHICH OF THE PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO INCREASE ITS GROUND FORCES, BUT THERE WAS NO REPLY.

57. STRULAK SAID THE QUESTION HAD BEEN ASKED WHAT OTHER POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT IN THE AREA WOULD ONE SEE, ASIDE FROM THAT DESCRIBED BY ALLIED REPS. THE ISSUE WAS BASICALLY A CASE OF INTENTIONS. IN THE TECHNICAL SENSE, IT WAS EASIER TO START WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS GIVEN THEIR HIGH STATE OF READINESS. THERE WAS ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY OF MISTAKE. US AIRCRAFT HAD DROPPED NUCLEAR BOMBS BY MISTAKE. THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR THROUGH ERROR IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD WAS CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN WHEN A SOLDIER WITH A TANK MADE A MISTAKE. UK REP SAID THIS WAS TRUE OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION WAS APPLICABLE TO ALL NUCLEAR FORCES AND DID NOT HELP THE EASTERN ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES INSIDE THE AREA. KHLESTOV RETORTED THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT TALKS WAS NOT THE PREVENTION OF WAR IN GENERAL.

58. US REP SAID THAT STRATEGIC PARITY DETERRED THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM OF ESCALATION. THIS SHOULD BE CLEAR. STRULAK SAID, BY THE SAME LOGIC, PARITY SHOULD PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES. US REP SAID THAT THIS WAS TO SOME DEGREE

THE CASE BUT EQUILIBRIUM IN GROUND FORCES WOULD DECREASE RELIANCE ON THE NUCLEAR DECISION.

60. KHLESTOV NOTED THIS WAS OFFICIAL NATO DOCTRINE AND ALSO THAT IT COULD CHANGE AS NATO DOCTRINE HAD CHANGED IN THE PAST. IT WAS NOT ADEQUATE AS A BASIS FOR MUTUAL AGREEMENT. PARTICIPANTS COULD UNDERTAKE SPECIFIC MEASURES ONLY ON THE BASIS OF SHARED VIEWPOINTS.

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THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE MIGHT BE REPLACED. US REP RESPONDED THAT THIS MIGHT BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE. BUT IF THERE WERE EQUILIBRIUM OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE RISK OF ANY CONFLICT WOULD BE REDUCED AND WITH IT THE NECESSITY TO RELY SO MUCH ON THIS THRESHOLD. THIS WAS A VERY PRACTICAL ISSUE. THERE WAS NO PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.

61. KHLESTOV SAID PARITY WAS CREATED BY TAKING ALL FORCE ELEMENTS TOGETHER. UK REP SAID THERE WAS AN OVERALL EAST/WEST NUCLEAR PARITY. ALLIED REPS WANTED CONVENTIONAL PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO SUPPLEMENT IT. STRULAK ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS NUCLEAR PARITY INSIDE THE AREA. UK REP SAID THAT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL BECAUSE OF THE LINKAGE OF WEAPONS OUTSIDE. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID OVERALL EAST/WEST NUCLEAR PARITY MIGHT EXIST. BUT WAS THERE PARITY IN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS INSIDE THE AREA? UK REP SAID HE WAS NOT SURE ABOUT THIS. WHAT WAS THE EASTERN VIEW? KLEIN SAID THAT, IF ONE WAS SPEAKING OF PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ONE HAD TO SPEAK OF ALL FORCE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA. UK REP ASKED WHETHER CZECHOSLOVAK REP MEANT THAT THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE TAKEN ELEMENT BY ELEMENT, OR IN WHAT WAY? KLEIN SAID PARITY WAS THE TOTALITY OF ALL COMPONENT ELEMENTS. UK REP ASKED WHETHER EAST TOOK PARITY IN EACH ELEMENT AS ITS GOAL. KLEIN SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE AIM WAS FOR PARITY IN THE TOTAL MIX. UK REP SAID WOULD IT NOT BE IMPORTANT TO GET PARITY IN GROUND FORCES? SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE HAD A COUNTER QUESTION. WHAT WERE THE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR EXCLUDING NUCLEAR AND AIR?

61. US REP SAID EASTERN REPS WERE SPEAKING OF AIR FORCES. THE EAST HAD MANY MORE AIRCRAFT THAN WEST IN THE AREA. THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST WOULD ENSHRINE THIS ADVANTAGE, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF GROUND FORCES. SMIROVSKY ASKED WHAT ABOUT NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA. US REP SAID HE DID NOT HAVE

DETAILS ON EASTERN WARHEADS IN AREA AND ASKED EASTERN REPS IF

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THEY COULD HELP. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE.

62. US DEP REP ASKED KHLESTOV HOW THE EAST INTENDED TO
COMPUTE NUMERICAL BASIS OF REDUCTIONS WHETHER IN
MANPOWER, AIR OR NUCLEARS WHEN THERE WAS SO MUCH VAGUENESS AND
SO MANY TOTALS WERE UNKNOWN. ONE COULD NOT TALK OF PERCENTAGE
OF REDUCTIONS, AS DID EASTERN REPS, WHEN ONE DIDN'T KNOW
THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF WHICH ONE WAS REDUCING A
CERTAIN PERCENTAGE.

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2025

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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63. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT ONE WOULD FOR THE MOMENT USE THE FIGURE "X" MINUS A CERTAIN AGREED PERCENT AND "Y" MINUS AN AGREED PERCENT FOR THE FIGURES OF EACH SIDE. WHEN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THIS PERCENTAGE, THE NUMBER TO BE REDUCED WOULD BE LISTED IN THE SPECIAL PROTOCOL. US DEP REP ASKED HOW THIS WOULD BE A PRACTICAL PROCEDURE WHEN BOTH THE STARTING TOTALS AND FINAL LEVELS WERE UNKNOWN AND WOULD REMAIN SO. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EACH SIDE KNEW ENOUGH ABOUT THE TOTALS OF THE OTHER TO MAKE THIS FEASIBLE.

64. UK REP SAID THIS ENTIRE PROCEDURE APPEARED TO HIM HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE AND SEEMED TO HIM TO BE AN EXAMPLE OF THAT PURELY THEORETICAL BASIS OF DISCUSSION THE SOVIETS REPS HAD SAID THEY WISHED TO AVOID. TAKING A FIXED PERCENTAGE OF TWO
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UNKNOWN WAS HIGHLY ABSTRACT. KHLESTOV SAID THE EAST WAS VERY SERIOUS ABOUT THIS APPROACH. IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THERE WOULD BE NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS, THEN PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE ON THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTION. AND, AS SOON AS THE PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS WAS AGREED, ONE COULD FORMULATE THE FIGURES. THIS WAS A TECHNICAL DETAIL. UK REP ASKED HOW PARTICIPANTS COULD JUDGE THE EFFECT OF REDUCTIONS IF THEY COULD NOT MEASURE THE OUTCOME. SMIRNOVSKY REPLIED THIS WOULD BE DONE ON TRUST. KHLESTOV SAID EACH SIDE HAD AN APPROXIMATE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS WHAT ON THE OTHER SIDE. HE COULD NOT AGREE WITH UK REP'S STATEMENT. WHAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAD WAS KNOWN BY WEST. US REP SAID THE SITUATION AS REGARDS AIRCRAFT WAS FAIRLY CLEAR. EAST HAD ABOUT 1,200 MORE AIRCRAFT THAN WEST. HE ASKED KHLESTOV IF THIS FIGURE WAS ROUGHLY CORRECT AS REGARDS AIRCRAFT. THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT WITH REGARD TO INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

65. KHLESTOV SAID IT WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO DISCUSS NUMBERS. THE MEANS OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY WERE APPROXIMATELY KNOWN. WEST HAD SOME KNOWLEDGE OF THIS. ADMITTEDLY, WARHEADS WERE MORE COMPLICATED. DELIVERY VEHICLES WERE CLEARER. BUT AGREEMENTS WHERE THE BASE FIGURES WERE NOT SPECIFIED WERE NOT WITHOUT PRECEDENT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CONVENTION PREVENTING PRODUCTION OF BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS WAS SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THIS WAS NOT AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE. BELGIAN REP SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS DANGEROUS TO COMPARE THE CONCEPT OF THE TREATY BANNING BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WHERE

THERE WAS SOME SORT OF TACIT AGREEMENT TO EXCLUDE
THESE WEAPONS FROM USE, WITH THE REAL DANGER OF
CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT WITH ITS RISK OF ESCALATION.
UK REP POINTED OUT THAT TREATMENT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
WEAPONS HAD BEEN SEPARATED AS IT HAD BEEN
DISCOVERED THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEEDED MORE
STRINGENT VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. KHLESTOV SAID
THERE WERE MANY EXAMPLES. IF THERE WAS A WILL,
THERE WOULD BE A WAY. IF THE WILL WERE AT
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HAND, ANSWERS TO TECHNICAL QUESTIONS COULD BE FOUND.
US REP SAID ALLIES STILL FELT THAT WHAT WOULD BE
ACHIEVED BY REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
AIRCRAFT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE ADDITION TO THE COMPLEXITY
OF THE TASK AND WOULD HINDER THE SEARCH FOR A PRACTICAL
OUTCOME.

66. BELGIAN REP SAID HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY TWO
POINTS. STRULAK HAD SAID THE WEST FEARED EASTERN
TANKS WHILE THE EAST FEARED WEST'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
IT WAS WORTH TAKING NOTE OF THIS POINT. THE SECOND
POINT HE WISHED TO NOTE WAS THE DISCUSSION ABOUT
THE INTERPRETATION ABOUT THE TERM "ARMAMENTS" IN
THE COMMUNIQUE. KHLESTOV'S ARGUMENTS SEEMED
DIRECTED TOWARD FINDING A LEGAL DEFINITION. THE
ALLIES WERE INTERESTED IN GIVING THE WORDSOME
PRACTICAL CONTENT TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL.

67. UK REP SAID HE WOULD NOT TRY TO SUM UP A LONG AND VARIED
DISCUSSION. IT HAD BEEN A USEFUL DISCUSSION. HE
COULD ONLY SAY THAT A LOT OF DIFFERENCES REMAINED.

68. KHLESTOV SAID HE HAD ALSO CONSIDERED THE
DISCUSSION TO HAVE BEEN USEFUL. BUT THE TASK
BEFORE THE PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT ONLY TO EXCHANGE
VIEWS. HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE EAST
UNDERSTOOD THE WESTERN CONCERN ABOUT GROUND FORCES.
IN RETURN, EAST WOULD LIKE THE WEST TO TAKE SERIOUSLY
ITS ARGUMENTS AND ITS CONCERN ON THE IMPORTANCE OF AIR FORCES

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AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 AECE-00 /162 W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2026

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF REDUCING
THESE FORCES AS WELL. THE EAST HAD STATED ITS READI-
NESS TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES BUT, BUT THE EAST WANTED WEST
TO ACT IN THE SAME WAY AND TO REALIZE THAT THERE
WAS A STRONG EASTERN INTEREST IN AIR AND NUCLEAR
FORCES AND TO AGREE TO REDUCE THESE WEAPONS AS
WELL. THERE WERE MANY ARGUMENTS ON THIS ISSUE.
BUT THE MAIN PRACTICAL THING WHICH HAD TO BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT WAS THE INTERESTS OF THOSE STATES
CONCERNED IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED
REPS SHOULD TREAT EASTERN INTERESTS IN SOME ASPECTS
OF REDUCTIONS JUST AS THE EAST TREATED ALLIED
INTERESTS. THERE WAS A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF
THE DESIRE TO REDUCE GROUND FORCES. HE WOULD LIKE
TO SEE THE RESULT OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION REFLECTED
IN AN EQUALLY COMMON DESIRE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR AND
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AIR FORCES, TO AGREE ON PRINCIPLE ON THIS MATTER
AND THEN TO SEE HOW MUCH COULD BE REDUCED.

69. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE A FURTHER POINT.

SOVIET REP HAD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WESTERN DESIRE TO
REDUCE GROUND FORCES. HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR
THAT ALLIED REPS HAD AN EQUAL INTEREST IN HOW
THESE FORCES WERE REDUCED. THIS HAD A DIRECT
BEARING ON THE GOAL OF ESTABLISHING EQUILIBRIUM
AND IN REDUCING THE DANGER OF WAR. EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS
IN THE EASTERN MODE WERE NOT THE WAY.

70. KHLESTOV SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT MADE BY US REP.
NONETHLESS, HE FELT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REACH UNDERSTANDING
IN PRINCIPLE THAT ALL THREE ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED
FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED AND THEN SEE HOW BEST TO
ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

71. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT SESSION WOULD TAKE
PLACE ON MARCH 18.HUMES

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